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areas reduces but does not eliminate 
the risk for disease associated with 
consumption of raw or undercooked 
oysters (3). 
Oysters from many parts of the 
world have been implicated in previ-
ous norovirus outbreaks (3–6), in-
cluding similar norovirus outbreaks 
in New Zealand in 2004 and 2006 
caused by consumption of frozen oys-
ters from South Korea (6). In addition, 
norovirus was detected in 10% of im-
ported oysters in Hong Kong (7), and 
adenoviruses or enteroviruses were 
identifi ed in 80% of oyster samples 
from popular harvest areas in South 
Korea (8).
Although widely distributed com-
mercial foods are rarely implicated as 
a source of norovirus infections, oys-
ters (3) and raspberries (9) are notable 
exceptions. Without timely subtyping 
of virus specimens and a PulseNet-
like data-sharing system, cluster link-
age is unlikely. Norovirus infections 
are rarely confi rmed by laboratory 
tests, and sporadic cases are rarely 
considered notifi able. The outbreak 
we described was recognized and re-
ported because illnesses clustered in 
1 workplace. However, even when 
outbreaks are reported, they are not 
always investigated thoroughly. The 
conventional wisdom that many, if not 
most, foodborne norovirus outbreaks 
are caused by contamination at the 
point of service (10) may discourage 
thorough epidemiologic investigations 
of these outbreaks.
Because thorough outbreak in-
vestigations are time-consuming and 
gastroenteritis outbreaks are common, 
resource issues often affect decisions 
about how intensively to pursue inves-
tigations. Our use of integrated ques-
tionnaire, data entry, and analysis tem-
plates (www.oregon.gov/DHS/ph/acd/
keene.shtml) facilitated a quick and 
effi cient response to the outbreak de-
scribed here. Questionnaire design, in-
terviews, data entry, and analysis were 
completed within 6 hours of the initial 
report, and distributors and regula-
tory agencies worked quickly to recall 
other oysters from the same source, 
thus probably preventing additional 
illnesses. We believe that widespread 
use of such templates would increase 
the number of outbreaks that could be 
investigated thoroughly.
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Epidemiologic 
Questions from 
Anthrax Outbreak, 
Hunter Valley, 
Australia
To the Editor: Anthrax was in-
troduced into Australia in 1847 near 
Sydney, New South Wales, and spread 
along stock routes throughout New 
South Wales and southern Queensland 
(1). Anthrax was considered endem-
ic to the Hunter Valley, New South 
Wales, during the 1890s. The last re-
corded anthrax-related stock losses 
there occurred on 3 properties in the 
Upper Hunter Valley in 1939 (1).
During the past 4 decades, an-
thrax has become uncommon in Aus-
tralia. Clinical cases are seen only spo-
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radically in sheep, cattle, and (rarely) 
horses. Annually, 6–12 properties are 
affected in unrelated incidents; where 
cattle are involved, generally only 1–3 
animals per property are affected (2). 
Anthrax is confi ned almost exclusive-
ly to a belt running through the center 
of New South Wales (3). 
From December 14, 2007, 
through January 3, 2008, a total of 53 
cattle (Bos taurus) with peracute an-
thrax and 1 horse died on 11 properties 
in the Rouchel area, 20 km east of Ab-
erdeen in the Hunter Valley and 350 
km from the anthrax belt (Figure). The 
area is hilly, rising to ≈550 m, with al-
luvial soils alongside a stream and 
rocky basaltic and sandy soils on the 
slopes. Most properties feature gullies 
that fl ow intermittently after rain. The 
affected properties covered ≈60 km2. 
The animals that died in this 
area were of all ages. Anthrax was 
not suspected because of a long his-
tory of no local activity, but Bacillus 
anthracis was initially confi rmed by 
microscopy of blood smears and sub-
sequently by PCR of blood or other 
carcass fl uid smear scrapings taken 
when animals were decomposed and 
microscopy was unreliable (4). Dates 
of discovery of the index case on each 
property ranged from December 14 to 
December 29; 1–26 deaths (median 2) 
occurred per property. Property attack 
rates varied from 0.9% (1/110 cattle) 
to 10.7% (3/28 cattle). All stock on 
infected and 24 neighboring proper-
ties were vaccinated in late December; 
carcasses were burned to ash; move-
ment control, including quarantine, 
was implemented; and all subsequent 
stock deaths in the area were investi-
gated to rule out anthrax. One subse-
quent case occurred when an unvac-
cinated bull was introduced onto an 
infected property in late May 2008.
Detailed record review excluded 
importation of infected feed from 
known anthrax-endemic areas before 
the outbreak, and no deaths occurred 
in stock introduced from these areas 
during the previous month. Many of 
the animals died near streams, and wa-
terborne spore dispersal with infection 
was initially hypothesized. However, 
the temporal pattern of properties af-
fected, with downstream properties af-
fected before upstream properties; the 
fact that properties without contiguous 
streams were affected; and the dilu-
tion effect of rapidly fl owing streams 
argued against this transmission route. 
Because they are septicemic, terminal-
ly ill animals with anthrax often seek 
water (5).
The mysterious contemporaneous 
reemergence of anthrax in this area is 
unlikely to be explained by mechani-
cal vector-borne transmission because 
only 1 animal had eye damage, sug-
gesting a crow attack. There was no 
additional evidence of scavenger at-
tack. No tabanid species (biting) fl ies 
were seen on any carcass, and the 
small number of carcasses and rela-
tively large distances between some 
properties made mechanical transmis-
sion with ocular inoculation by non-
biting fl ies unlikely (4).
Both the remarkable survival 
capability of anthrax spores and a 
1-in-100-year rain event probably 
contributed to the near-simultaneous 
reemergence of anthrax on multiple 
properties in this area. Anthrax spores 
are resistant to biological extremes of 
heat, cold, pH, desiccation, chemicals, 
and irradiation, persisting in this state 
for decades awaiting conditions that 
favor germination and multiplication 
(6). In June 2007, drought-ravaged 
Hunter Valley experienced intense 
fl ooding; most rain fell in just 3 days 
(259 mm in the Aberdeen area, com-
pared with the previous 3-year June 
average of 43 mm), and massive 
amounts of topsoil washed into gullies 
and streams. During late 2007, rainfall 
also was excessive: 132 mm and 129 
mm in November and December, re-
spectively, compared with the 3-year 
average of 87 mm and 65 mm.
The June fl oods are likely to have 
unearthed anthrax spores in the area. 
The question remains whether these 
spores had been present for >6 de-
cades, concentrating in depressions 
that collected water and dead vegeta-
tion, potentially providing a milieu for 
germination and multiplication (i.e., 
incubator areas), a mechanism that has 
been implicated in wildlife epidemics 
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Figure. Map of New South Wales, Australia, showing the anthrax belt (gray shading) and 
the Rouchel location where anthrax reemerged during December 14, 2007–January 3, 
2008.
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of anthrax (7,8). Alternatively, low-
grade sporadic infection may have 
been ongoing since the 1940s and in-
frequent stock mortality may not have 
been investigated for anthrax because 
of a low local index of suspicion, re-
sulting in environmental contamina-
tion The extreme weather conditions 
in the area may have unearthed spores 
from undiagnosed carcasses, provid-
ing simultaneous exposures on mul-
tiple properties. 
We are currently unable to resolve 
this epidemiologic conundrum. How-
ever, our experience is a timely remind-
er that veterinary public health authori-
ties should be on high alert for possible 
anthrax when unexpected livestock 
deaths follow fl ooding in areas where 
anthrax has historically occurred.
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Distinct 
Ecologically 
Relevant Strains of 
Anaplasma 
phagocytophilum
To the Editor: Anaplasma phago-
cytophilum was defi ned to include Eh-
rlichia phagocytophila, E. equi, and 
the agent of human granulocytic eh-
rlichiosis. Nevertheless, we and oth-
ers have found phenotypic and genetic 
differences from diverse regions and 
hosts and conclude preliminarily that 
ecologically separate strains might ex-
ist that should be distinguished. Two 
precedents include ruminant strains of 
A. phagocytophilum in Europe and the 
Ap-Variant 1 from ruminants and ticks 
of North America and Europe.
In Europe, A. phagocytophi-
lum infects livestock, rodents, and 
humans, with some species such as 
European cattle showing severe dis-
ease and high antibody prevalence. In 
contrast, cattle infection is rare in the 
United States, despite being common 
in other species. Experimental infec-
tion of cattle with California equine–
origin strain MRK failed to induce 
disease or marked rickettsemia (1). 
Thus, even though European strains 
have ruminant tropism, an equine 
strain does not.
Ap-Variant 1 is found in ticks and 
deer in North America. This strain is 
distinctive in the 16S rRNA, major 
surface protein 4 (msp4), msp2, and 
ankA genes (2). Deer, goats, and tick-
derived cell lines can be infected with 
Ap-Variant 1, but rodents cannot (3). 
Our recent data examining A. phago-
cytophilum in western North America 
show at least 2 phenotypes: strains 
originating from sciurids (chipmunks 
and tree squirrels) and strains from 
woodrats (the previously postulated 
reservoir). In a survey of 2,121 small 
mammals in areas of California with 
enzootic Ap-Variant 1, seroprevalence 
was highest in tree squirrels (71%), 
woodrats (50%), and chipmunks (up 
to 28%), and PCR prevalence was 
highest in tree squirrels (16%) and 
chipmunks (34%) (4). We showed 
that chipmunks were competent 
reservoirs for A. phagocytophilum 
through exposure in the fi eld, success-
ful inoculation with strain MRK, and 
transmission through Ixodes pacifi cus 
to mice. However, discrepancy in the 
phenotype of strains originating from 
woodrats and chipmunks is substan-
tial when these strains are inoculated 
into horses. One chipmunk strain can 
infect both rodents and horses (im-
portant laboratory animal models for 
human infection), whereas woodrat 
strains show restricted rodent-only 
tropism.
A naturally infected redwood 
chipmunk was trapped in Mendocino 
County, California, exsanguinated, 
and documented to be positive for A. 
phagocytophilum by using real-time 
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